In 2006 the war in Afghanistan killed more than 6,000 people. Suicide bombings and bombardments took place daily, and the “Taliban resistance,” according to the commanders of NATO, has never been so strong. At the end of a year of blood a small handbook appeared in the country, intended by Mullah Omar for the combatants in the holy war. In the nine pages in the Pashtun language, simply titled “Regulation,” the supreme leader of the self-styled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan lays down thirty rules of conduct for all the mujahedin. The greatest worry of the top Taliban seems to be that of consolidating the ranks, thus avoiding that anarchy—that now reigns sovereign in the nation—is also extended to the army of the movement.

Forbidden the do-it-yourself. The major part of the prescriptions thus underline the importance of the chain of command. Rule number seven, for example, wants to discourage do-it-yourself abductions: “If a mujahedin captures an infidel in an invasion, without the permission of the leader of the movement he cannot exchange the prisoner for another prisoner or for money.” It seems to be very nearly a reference to the sequestration of the Italian Gabriele Torsello, held as a hostage for almost a month in the southern province of Helmand. His abduction was claimed by men who are said to be Taliban, while “official” spokesmen of the jihad categorically denied any involvement. But it isn’t the only episode of this kind happening in recent months. It is also forbidden, rule number nine, to use equipment for personal reasons—vehicles, arms, explosives—intended for the holy war; private disputes, which frequently result in gunshots, cannot be settled with the AK-47s of the jihad.

To fill a void. The Taliban succeed in gaining an always greater consensus among the population thanks to the void of power that characterizes the country. Outside of the capital the state does not exist, so much so that President Karzai has been ironically rebaptized by the Afghans “the mayor of Kabul.” And it is exactly on this void that the Taliban count in order to impose their own domination, as rule number two also suggests: “To those who abandon the infidels, we will guarantee security for yourself and for your property.” This the citizens of the south bitterly confirm: “At night NATO isn’t here with us, the Taliban are here.”

Schools in the sights. Rule number twenty-four identifies one of the principal enemies of jihad--teaching: “It is forbidden to work for the puppet regime, either in a madrasa, or as schoolteachers. Muslims must study in mosques, and therefore on the texts that go back to the war of the mujahedin—that is, the anti-Soviet struggle—or to the time of the Taliban.” What happens if a teacher, notwithstanding warnings, refuses to abandon teaching? The answer is in the next rule: “He must be beaten, and if he still refuses, he must be killed.” And the schools “must be burned, but not before having saved the religious texts.” A rule that puts on paper what has, in fact, already happened: from the beginning of the year at least fifty teachers have been killed and tens of schools given to the flames—above all in the south of Afghanistan, and in particular schools for girls.

The image is everything. The non-governmental organizations are also in the sights of Mullah Omar: “The ngos that have come into the country with the government of the infidels are exactly like the government, they are part of this regime,” one reads in rule number twenty-six. “Here is why every one of their activities will be banished, whether it’s the construction of a bridge, a road, or a school.” The mujahedin combatants, then, must behave correctly and give themselves the image of good muslims in order to not alienate the favor of the population. It is prohibited to smoke cigarettes, and specifically forbidden to appropriate the money or property of citizens. It is not allowed, under penalty of expulsion from the movement, according to rule number fifteen, “to bother innocent people.” And yet, rule number nineteen, it is not permitted to Taliban militiamen “to carry away beardless boys on the field of battle or in their own homes.” An act of making precise, this last, that looks to put a stop to that which many whisper, but no one says.