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SITO OSCURATO
Se sospettate qualsiasi attivita' eversiva, terroristica o criminale Vi
preghiamo di comunicare immediatamente al nostro centro o alle forze di
polizia, usando l'email in rosso.
La sua identita' restera' riservata.
PREVENTING TERRORIST ATTACK:
How You Can Help.
This is a message that bears repeating, no matter where you live in the
world: Your assistance is needed in preventing terrorist acts.
It's a fact that certain kinds of activities can indicate terrorist
plans that are in the works, especially when they occur at or near high
profile sites or places where large numbers of people gather--like
government buildings, military facilities, utilities, bus or train
stations, major public events. If you see or know about suspicious
activities, like the ones listed below, please report them immediately
to the proper authorities. In the United States, that means your
closest Joint Terrorist Task Force, located in an FBI Field Office. In
other countries, that means your closest law
enforcement/counterterrorism agency.
Surveillance: Are you aware of anyone video recording or monitoring
activities, taking notes, using cameras, maps, binoculars, etc., near
key facilities/events?
Suspicious Questioning: Are you aware of anyone attempting to gain
information in person, by phone, mail, email, etc., regarding a key
facility or people who work there?
Tests of Security: Are you aware of any attempts to penetrate or test physical
security or procedures at a key facility/event?
Acquiring Supplies: Are you aware of anyone attempting to improperly
acquire explosives, weapons, ammunition, dangerous chemicals, uniforms,
badges, flight manuals, access cards or identification for a key
facility/event or to legally obtain items under suspicious
circumstances that could be used in a terrorist attack?
Suspicious Persons: Are you aware of anyone who does not appear to
belong in the workplace, neighborhood, business establishment or near a
key facility/event?
"Dry Runs": Have you observed any behavior that appears to be
preparation for a terrorist act, such as mapping out routes, playing
out scenarios with other people, monitoring key facilities/events,
timing traffic lights or traffic flow, or other suspicious activities?
Deploying Assets: Have you observed abandoned vehicles, stockpiling of
suspicious materials, or persons being deployed near a key
facility/event?
If you answered yes to any of the above...if you have observed any
suspicious activity that may relate to terrorism...again, please
contact the closest authorities to you immediately. Your tip could save
the lives of innocent people, just like you and yours.
European nations worked in close partnership with the United States in
the global counterterrorism campaign and have continued to strengthen
their legal and administrative ability to take action against
terrorists and their supporters, including freezing their assets. The
contributions of European countries in sharing intelligence, arresting
members of terrorist cells, and interdicting terrorist financing and
logistics continued to be vital elements in the war on terrorism.
Allies such as France and the United Kingdom were particularly
responsive during periods of heightened security, cooperating with
United States officials to monitor airline flights of concern.
The European Union (EU) has been a reliable partner in the war on
terrorism and has significantly strengthened its legal and
administrative ability, and that of EU member states, to take action
against terrorists and their supporters -- including freezing their
assets -- in the past several years. International judicial cooperation
advanced in 2003, as EU members changed domestic legislation to
incorporate provision of the European Arrest Warrant, which was
scheduled to come into effect in early 2004. The EU and United States
signed new Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties at the G-8
Summit in June 2003 that will expand law enforcement and judicial
cooperation. Significant deficiencies remained, however, and some
countries have legal impediments to taking firm judicial action against
known terrorists, often stemming from asylum laws, inadequate
counterterrorism legislation, or high standards of evidence that afford
loopholes and limit the ability of authorities to hold suspects. The EU
as a whole was reluctant to take steps to block the assets of charities
associated with HAMAS and Hizballah.
Italy
Italy has been a staunch ally in the war against terror and has made
significant contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Italy deployed a
1,000- troop task force in Afghanistan, its first major combat
deployment since World War II. The Italian Government also maintains
approximately 3,000 troops, civilian personnel, and paramilitary
Carabinieri in Iraq. Despite the terrorist bombing of 2 November of the
Italian Carabinieri headquarters in Nasiriyah, Iraq, which killed 19
Italian citizens, Italy remains one of the four largest contributors of
troops and personnel to ongoing stabilization operations in Iraq.
Italy’s law enforcement authorities maintained an ongoing and largely
effective initiative against Italy-based terrorist suspects, including
investigation, detentions, prosecutions, and expulsions. According to
Ministry of Interior data, Italian authorities in 2003 arrested 71
individuals suspected of planning or providing support to terrorist
activity. Many of those arrested were suspected al-Qaida operatives and
recruiters or facilitators for Ansar al-Islam and other al-Qaida–linked
extremist organizations.
In November, Italy’s Minister of Interior for the first time exercised
ministerial authority to expel seven terrorist suspects who he assessed
posed 50 a serious terrorist threat to Italy’s national security. The
Italian Government declared that, while there may have been
insufficient evidence to arrest the suspects, lengthy investigation had
compiled compelling evidence that the seven were Islamic extremists who
posed a threat to the national security.
Preventing terrorism financing has also been a key goal of the Italian
Government as a part of its war against terrorism. To date, Italy has
fully complied with the asset-freezing requirements imposed by UN
Security Council Resolutions and EU mechanisms. In January, Italy
ratified and brought into effect the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and adopted a number of
provisions to adjust Italian legislation accordingly. Under the
ratification law, penalties for the crimes of money laundering -- if
committed during banking or professional activities -- are now extended
to terrorism financing crimes. The Government of Italy in 2003 also
submitted 30 names of individuals suspected of links to al-Qaida to the
UN 1267 Sanctions Committee for listing on its consolidated list of
individuals and/or entities associated with al-Qaida, the Taliban, or
Usama Bin Ladin, making them subject to sanctions. The Italian
Government froze their assets in Italy.
The domestic leftwing terrorist group, the new Red Brigades–Communist
Combatant Party (BRCCP), also presents an ongoing terrorist threat to
Italian national security. Italian authorities continue their efforts
to dismantle and prevent terrorist acts by the BR-CCP, which has used
assassination of government officials as a tool of terror during the
last several years. In March, two BR-CCP activists engaged police
officers in a shootout on a train. One of the group’s leaders was
arrested and remains in detention; another member was killed.
Subsequently, Italian authorities in October arrested several suspected
BR-CCP activists using evidence seized from the detained leader, and
they assess that they have made significant progress in dismantling the
terrorist group.
Italy is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism.
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SOURCE: US DEPARTMENT of STATE
[Print Friendly Version]
Patterns of Global Terrorism -2003
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 29, 2004
Appendix B -- Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
CONTENTS
Abu Nidal organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Ansar al-Islam (AI)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
‘Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM)
Hizballah (Party of God)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad, EIJ)
Kahane Chai (Kach)
Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, KADEK)
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
National Liberation Army (ELN)—Colombia
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC)
Al-Qaida
Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Nuclei (RN)
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 135
Salafi st Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL)
United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)
Abu Nidal organization (ANO)
a.k.a. Fatah—the Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades,
Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
Description
International terrorist organization founded by Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a.
Abu Nidal). Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional
committees, including political, military, and financial. In November
2002, Abu Nidal died in Baghdad; the new leadership of the organization
is unclear. First designated in October 1997.
Activities
Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring
almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various
Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in
December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am
Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros
day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988. Suspected of
assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul
in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in
Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO
representative there. Has not staged a major attack against Western
targets since the late 1980s.
Strength
Few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.
Location/Area of Operation
Al-Banna relocated to Iraq in December 1998 where the group maintains a
presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon including in several
Palestinian refugee camps. Authorities shut down the ANO’s operations
in Libya and Egypt in 1999. Has demonstrated ability to operate over
wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Financial
problems and internal disorganization have reduced the group’s
activities and capabilities.
External Aid
Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training,
logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria
(until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Description
The ASG is a small, brutally violent Muslim separatist group operating
in the southern Philippines. Some ASG leaders allegedly fought in
Afghanistan during the Soviet war and are students and proponents of
radical Islamic teachings. The group split from the much larger Moro
National Liberation Front in the early 1990s under the leadership of
Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine
police on 18 December 1998. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani,
has replaced him as the nominal leader of the group, which is composed
of several semiautonomous factions. First designated in October 1997.
Activities
Engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, beheadings,
assassinations, and extortion. Although from time to time it claims
that its motivation is to promote an independent Islamic state in
western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago—areas in the southern
Philippines heavily populated by Muslims—the ASG has primarily used
terror for financial profit. Recent bombings may herald a return to a
more radical, politicized agenda, at least among the factions. The
group’s first large-scale action was a raid on the town of Ipil in
Mindanao in April 1995. In April of 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21
persons—including 10 Western tourists—from a resort in Malaysia.
Separately in 2000, the group briefly abducted several foreign
journalists, three Malaysians, and a US citizen. On 27 May 2001, the
ASG kidnapped three US citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort
in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including one US
citizen, were murdered. During a Philippine military hostage rescue
operation on 7 June 2002, US hostage Gracia Burnham was wounded but
rescued, and her husband Martin Burnham and Filipina Deborah Yap were
killed during the operation. Philippine authorities say that the ASG
had a role in the bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga
on 2 October that killed three Filipinos and one US serviceman and
wounded 20 others. It is unclear what role ASG has played in subsequent
bombing attacks in Mindanao.
Strength
Estimated to have 200 to 500 members.
Location/Area of Operation
The ASG was founded in Basilan Province and operates there and in the
neighboring provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago. It
also operates in the Zamboanga peninsula, and members occasionally
travel to Manila. In mid-2003, the group started operating in the major
city of Cotobato and on the coast of Sultan Kudarat on Mindanao. The
group expanded its operational reach to Malaysia in 2000 when it
abducted foreigners from a tourist resort.
External Aid
Largely self-financing through ransom and extortion; may receive
support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia.
Libya publicly paid millions of dollars for the release of the foreign
hostages seized from Malaysia in 2000.
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (al-Aqsa) Description
The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades consists of an unknown number of small
cells of Fatah-affiliated terrorists that emerged at the outset of the
current intifadah to attack Israeli targets. It aims to drive the
Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
Jerusalem and to establish a Palestinian state. First designated in
March 2002.
Activities
Al-Aqsa has carried out shootings and suicide operations against
Israeli civilians and military personnel and has killed Palestinians
suspected of collaborating with Israel. At least five US citizens—four
of them dual US-Israeli citizens—were killed in al-Aqsa’s attacks. In
January 2002, al-Aqsa claimed responsibility for the first suicide
bombing carried out by a female.
Strength
Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation
Al Aqsa operates in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip and has
claimed attacks inside all three areas. It may have followers in
Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon.
External Aid
Unknown.
Ansar al-Islam (AI)
a.k.a. Partisans of
Islam, Helpers of Islam,
Supporters of Islam,
Jund al-Islam, Jaish
Ansar al-Sunna) Description
Ansar al-Islam is a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who
have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in Iraq. It was
formed in December 2001 and is closely allied with al-Qaida. Some of
its members trained in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan, and the group
provided safehaven to al-Qaida fighters before Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF). Since OIF, it has been one of the leading groups engaged in
anti- Coalition attacks. (Ansar al-Islam was designated on 20 February
2003, under E.O. 13224. The UNSCR 1267 Committee designated Ansar
al-Islam pursuant to UNSCRs 1267, 1390, and 1455 on 27 February 2003.)
First designated in March 2004.
Activities
The group has primarily fought against one of the two main Kurdish
political factions— the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—and has
mounted ambushes and attacks in PUK areas. AI members have been
implicated in assassinations and assassination attempts against PUK
officials and work closely with both al-Qaida operatives and associates
in Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network. Before OIF, some AI members claimed
to have produced cyanide-based toxins, ricin, and alfatoxin.
Strength
Approximately 700 to 1000 members.
Location/Area of Operation
Central and northern Iraq.
External Aid
The group receives funding, training, equipment, and combat support from al-Qaida
and other international jihadist backers.
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Description
An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the secular
Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA began its
violent activity in 1992 after the military government suspended
legislative elections in anticipation of an overwhelming victory by the
Islamic Salvation Front, the largest Islamic opposition party. First
designated in October 1997.
Activities
Frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Since 1992,
the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres,
sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation, although
the group’s dwindling numbers have caused a decrease in the number of
attacks. Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in
Algeria in 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and
women—mostly Europeans—in the country. The group uses assassinations
and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping
victims. The GIA highjacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December
1994. In 2002, a French court sentenced two GIA members to life in
prison for conducting a series of bombings in France in 1995.
Strength
Precise numbers unknown; probably fewer than 100.
Location/Area of Operation
Algeria and Europe.
External Aid
None known.
‘Asbat al-Ansar Description
‘Asbat al-Ansar—the League of the Followers or Partisans’ League—is a
Lebanon-based, Sunni extremist group, composed primarily of
Palestinians and associated with Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida
organization. The group follows an extremist interpretation of Islam
that justifies violence against civilian targets to achieve political
ends. Some of those goals include overthrowing the Lebanese Government
and thwarting perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the
country. First designated in March 2002.
Activities
‘Asbat al-Ansar has carried out multiple terrorist attacks in Lebanon
since it first emerged in the early 1990s. The group assassinated
Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor
stores in the mid-1990s. The group raised its operational profile in
2000 with two attacks against Lebanese and international targets. It
was involved in clashes in northern Lebanon in December 1999 and
carried out a rocket-propelled grenade attack on the Russian Embassy in
Beirut in January 2000. ‘Asbat al-Ansar’s leader, Abu Muhjin, remains
at large despite being sentenced to death in absentia for the murder in
1994 of a Muslim cleric.
In 2003, suspected ‘Asbat al-Ansar elements were responsible for the
attempt in April to use a car bomb against a McDonald’s in a Beirut
suburb. By October, Lebanese security forces arrested Ibn al-Shahid,
who is believed to be associated with ‘Asbat al- Ansar, and charged him
with masterminding the bombing of three fast food restaurants in 2002
and the attempted attack in April 2003 on the McDonald’s. ‘Asbat forces
were involved in other violence in Lebanon in 2003, including clashes
with members of Yassir Arafat’s Fatah movement in the ‘Ayn al-Hilwah
refugee camp and a rocket attack in June on the Future TV building in
Beirut.
Strength
The group commands about 300 fighters in Lebanon.
Location/Area of Operation
The group’s primary base of operations is the Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee
camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon.
External Aid
Probably receives money through international Sunni extremist networks and Usama
Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida network.
Aum Supreme Truth (Aum)
a.k.a. Aum Shinrikyo,
Aleph Description
A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, the Aum aimed to take over
Japan and then the world. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under
Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary
election in 1990. Over time, the cult began to emphasize the imminence
of the end of the world and stated that the United States would
initiate Armageddon by starting World War III with Japan. The Japanese
Government revoked its recognition of the Aum as a religious
organization in October 1995, but in 1997, a government panel decided
not to invoke the Anti-Subversive Law against the group, which would
have outlawed the cult. A 1999 law gave the Japanese Government
authorization to continue police surveillance of the group due to
concerns that the Aum might launch future terrorist attacks. Under the
leadership of Fumihiro Joyu, the Aum changed its name to Aleph in
January 2000 and claimed to have rejected the violent and apocalyptic
teachings of its founder. First designated in October 1997.
Activities
On 20 March 1995, Aum members simultaneously released the chemical
nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 persons
and injuring up to 6,000. The group was responsible for other
mysterious chemical accidents in Japan in 1994. Its efforts to conduct
attacks using biological agents have been unsuccessful. Japanese police
arrested Asahara in May 1995. Asahara was sentenced in February 2004
and received the death sentence for his role in the attacks of 1995.
Since 1997, the cult continued to recruit new members, engage in
commercial enterprise, and acquire property, although it scaled back
these activities significantly in 2001 in response to public outcry.
The cult maintains an Internet home page. In July 2001, Russian
authorities arrested a group of Russian Aum followers who had planned
to set off bombs near the Imperial Palace in Tokyo as part of an
operation to free Asahara from jail and then smuggle him to Russia.
Strength
The Aum’s current membership is estimated to be less than 1,000
persons. At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group claimed to
have 9,000 members in Japan and as many as 40,000 worldwide.
Location/Area of Operation
The Aum’s principal membership is located only in Japan, but a residual branch
comprising perhaps a few hundred followers has surfaced in Russia.
External Aid
None.
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
a.k.a. Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, Batasuna Description
Founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland
based on Marxist principles encompassing the Spanish Basque provinces
of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, as well as the autonomous region of
Navarra, and the southwestern French Departments of Labourd,
Basse-Navarra, and Soule. Recent Spanish counterterrorism initiatives
are hampering the group’s operational capabilities. Spanish police
arrested 125 ETA members and accomplices in 2003; French authorities
arrested 46, including the group’s top leadership; several other
members were arrested in Latin America, Germany, and the Netherlands.
In March 2003, a Spanish Supreme Court ruling banned ETA’s political
wing, Batasuna. Spain currently holds 572 ETA members in prison, while
France holds 124. First designated in October 1997.
Activities
Primarily involved in bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government
officials, security and military forces, politicians, and judicial
figures. During the summer of 2003, ETA targeted Spanish tourist areas.
In 2003, ETA killed three persons, a similar figure to 2002’s death
toll of five, and wounded dozens more. The group has killed more than
850 persons and injured hundreds of others since it began lethal
attacks in the early 1960s. ETA finances its activities primarily
through extortion and robbery.
Strength
Unknown; hundreds of members plus supporters.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain
and southwestern France but also has attacked Spanish and French
interests elsewhere.
External Aid
Has received training at various times in the past in Libya, Lebanon,
and Nicaragua. Some ETA members allegedly have received sanctuary in
Cuba while others reside in South America.
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
Description
The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the
NPA is a Maoist group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing
the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. The chairman of
the CPP’s Central Committee and the NPA’s founder, Jose Maria Sison,
reportedly directs CPP and NPA activity from the Netherlands, where he
lives in self-imposed exile. Fellow Central Committee member and
director of the CPP’s overt political wing, the National Democratic
Front (NDF), Luis Jalandoni also lives in the Netherlands and has
become a Dutch citizen. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla
group, the NPA has an active urban infrastructure to conduct terrorism
and uses city-based assassination squads. Derives most of its funding
from contributions of supporters in the Philippines, Europe, and
elsewhere and from so-called revolutionary taxes extorted from local
businesses and politicians. First designated in August 2002.
Designations by the United States and the European Union may have had
an impact on funding.
Activities
The NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, politicians,
judges, government informers, former rebels who wish to leave the NPA,
rival splinter groups, and alleged criminals. Opposes any US military
presence in the Philippines and attacked US military interests, killing
several US service personnel, before the US base closures in 1992.
Press reports in 1999 and in late 2001 indicated that the NPA is again
targeting US troops participating in joint military exercises as well
as US Embassy personnel. The NPA claimed responsibility for the
assassination of two congressmen from Quezon in May 2001 and Cagayan in
June 2001 and many other killings. In January 2002, the NPA publicly
expressed its intent to target US personnel if discovered in NPA
operating areas.
Strength
Slowly growing; estimated at more than 10,000. This number is
significantly lower than its peak strength of around 25,000 in the
1980s.
Location/Area of Operations
Operates in rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao. Has cells in Manila and
other metropolitan centers.
External Aid
Unknown.
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya
(Islamic Group, IG)
Description
Egypt’s largest militant group, active since the late 1970s, appears to
be loosely organized. Has an external wing with supporters in several
countries worldwide. The group issued a cease-fire in March 1999, but
its spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al- Rahman—sentenced to life in
prison in January 1996 for his involvement in the World Trade Center
bombing of 1993 and incarcerated in the United States—rescinded his
support for the cease-fi re in June 2000. The IG has not conducted an
attack inside Egypt since August 1998. Senior member signed Usama Bin
Ladin’s fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks against the United
States.
Unofficially split in two factions: one that supports the cease-fire
led by Mustafa Hamza, and one led by Rifa’i Taha Musa, calling for a
return to armed operations. Taha Musa in early 2001 published a book in
which he attempted to justify terrorist attacks that would cause mass
casualties. Musa disappeared several months thereafter, and there are
conflicting reports as to his current whereabouts. In March 2002,
members of the group’s historic leadership in Egypt declared use of
violence misguided and renounced its future use, prompting
denunciations by much of the leadership abroad. In 2003, the Egyptian
Government released more than 900 former IG members from prison.
For members still dedicated to violent jihad, the primary goal is to
overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state.
Disaffected IG members, such as those potentially inspired by Taha Musa
or Abd al-Rahman, may be interested in carrying out attacks against US
interests. First designated October 1997.
Activities
Group conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security and other
government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian opponents of
Islamic extremism before the cease-fire. From 1993 until the
cease-fire, IG launched attacks on tourists in Egypt— most notably the
attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. Also
claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The IG never
has specifically attacked a US citizen or facility but has threatened
US interests.
Strength
Unknown. At its peak the IG probably commanded several thousand
hard-core members and a like number of sympathizers. The cease-fire of
1999 and security crackdowns following the attack in Luxor in 1997 and,
more recently, security efforts following September 11, probably have
resulted in a substantial decrease in the group’s numbers.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates mainly in the Al-Minya, Asyut, Qina, and Sohaj Governorates of southern
Egypt. Also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other
urban locations, particularly among unemployed graduates and students.
Has a worldwide presence, including in the United Kingdom, Afghanistan,
Yemen, and various locations in Europe.
External Aid
Unknown. The Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Usama Bin Ladin,
and Afghan militant groups support the organization. Also may obtain
some funding through various
Islamic nongovernmental organizations.
HAMAS
a.k.a. Islamic
Resistance Movement Description
Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both violent and
political means— including terrorism—to pursue the goal of establishing
an Islamic Palestinian state in Israel. Loosely structured, with some
elements working clandestinely and others openly through mosques and
social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize
activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS’s strength is concentrated
in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. First designated in October 1997.
Activities
HAMAS terrorists, especially those in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam
Brigades, have conducted many attacks—including large-scale suicide
bombings—against Israeli civilian and military targets. HAMAS
maintained the pace of its operational activity during 2002-03,
claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. HAMAS has not yet
directly targeted US interests, although the group makes little or no
effort to avoid targets frequented by foreigners. HAMAS continues to
confine its attacks to Israel and the territories.
Strength
Unknown number of official members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation
HAMAS currently limits its terrorist operations to Israeli military and
civilian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. The group’s
leadership is dispersed throughout the Gaza Strip and West Bank, with a
few senior leaders residing in Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the Gulf
States.
External Aid
Receives some funding from Iran but primarily relies on donations from
Palestinian expatriates around the world and private benefactors,
particularly in Western Europe, North America, and the Persian Gulf
region.
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
(Movement of Holy Warriors) Description
The HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates
primarily in Kashmir. It is politically aligned with the radical
political party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F).
Longtime leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February
2000 stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to the popular
Kashmiri commander and his second in command, Farooq Kashmiri. Khalil,
who has been linked to Usama Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February
1998 calling for attacks on US and Western interests, assumed the
position of HUM Secretary General. HUM operated terrorist training
camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition airstrikes destroyed them
during fall 2001. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar
(JUA), and Pakistan banned the successor JUA in November 2003. First
designated in October 1997.
Activities
Has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian
targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that
kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed
in August 1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December
of the same year. The HUM is responsible for the hijacking of an Indian
airliner on 24 December 1999, which resulted in the release of Masood
Azhar—an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar imprisoned by
the Indians in 1994—and Ahmed Omar Sheik, who was convicted of the
abduction/murder in January-February 2002 of US journalist Daniel Pearl.
Strength
Has several hundred armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan,
and India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions and in the Kashmir
valley. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include
Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy
machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost
a significant share of its membership in defections to the
Jaish-i-Mohammed (JIM) in 2000.
Location/Area of Operation
Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan,
but members conduct insurgent and terrorist activities primarily in
Kashmir. The HUM trained its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
External Aid
Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic states
and from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The HUM’s financial collection
methods also include soliciting donations from magazine ads and
pamphlets. The sources and amount of HUM’s military funding are
unknown. In anticipation of asset seizures in 2001 by the Pakistani
Government, the HUM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in
legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and
production of consumer goods. Its fundraising in Pakistan has been
constrained since the government clampdown on extremist groups and
freezing of terrorist assets. The United States announced the addition
of HUM to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list in 1997.
Hizballah (Party of God)
a.k.a. Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary
Justice Organization,
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of
Palestine
Description
Also known as Lebanese Hizballah, this group was formed in 1982 in
response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, this Lebanon-based radical
Shi’a group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian
revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The Majlis
al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group’s highest governing
body and is led by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Hizballah is
dedicated to liberating Jerusalem and eliminating Israel and has
formally advocated ultimate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon.
Nonetheless, Hizballah has actively participated in Lebanon’s political
system since 1992. Hizballah is closely allied with, and often directed
by, Iran but has the capability and willingness to act alone. Although
Hizballah does not share the Syrian regime’s secular orientation, the
group has been a strong ally in helping Syria advance its political
objectives in the region. First designated in October 1997.
Activities
Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US and
anti-Israeli terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombings of
the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the US
Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Three members of
Hizballah—‘Imad Mughniyah, Hasan Izz-al-Din, and Ali Atwa—are on the
FBI’s list of 22 Most-Wanted Terrorists for the hijacking in 1985 of
TWA Flight 847 during which a US Navy diver was murdered. Elements of
the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of US and
other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah also attacked the
Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and the Israeli cultural center in
Buenos Aires in 1994. In fall 2000, Hizballah operatives captured three
Israeli soldiers in the Shab’a Farms and kidnapped an Israeli
noncombatant whom may have been lured to Lebanon under false pretenses.
In 2003, Hizballah appeared to have established a presence in Iraq, but
for the moment its activities there are limited. Hizballah Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah stated in speeches that “we are heading . . .
toward the end and elimination of Israel from the region” and that the
group’s “slogan is and will continue to be death to America.”
Hizballah’s television station, al-Manar, continued to use inflammatory
images and reporting in an effort to encourage the intifadah and
promote Palestinian suicide operations.
Strength
Several thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and
southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South
America, North America, and Asia.
External Aid
Receives financial, training, weapons, explosives, political,
diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and diplomatic, political,
and logistic support from Syria. Receives financial support from
sympathetic business interests and individuals worldwide, largely
through the Lebanese diaspora.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Description
Coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian
states. The IMU is closely affiliated with al-Qaida and, under the
leadership of Tohir Yoldashev, has embraced Usama Bin Ladin’s anti-US,
anti-Western agenda. The IMU also remains committed to its original
goals of overthrowing Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov and
establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. First designated in
September 2000.
Activities
The IMU in recent years has participated in attacks on US and Coalition
soldiers in Afghanistan and plotted attacks on US diplomatic facilities
in Central Asia. In May 2003, Kyrgyzstani security forces disrupted an
IMU cell that was seeking to bomb the US Embassy and a nearby hotel in
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The IMU primarily targeted Uzbekistani interests
before October 2001 and is believed to have been responsible for five
car bombs in Tashkent in February 1999. Militants also took foreigners
hostage in 1999 and 2000, including four US citizens who were mountain
climbing in August 2000 and four Japanese geologists and eight
Kyrgyzstani soldiers in August 1999.
Strength
Probably fewer than 700 militants.
Location/Area of Operation
Militants are scattered throughout South Asia, Tajikistan, and Iran.
Area of operations includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
External Aid
Support from other Islamic extremist groups and patrons in the Middle East and
Central and South Asia.
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
a.k.a. Tehrik ul-Furqaah,
Khuddam-ul-Islam Description
The Jaish-e-Mohammed is an Islamic extremist group based in Pakistan
that was formed by Masood Azhar upon his release from prison in India
in early 2000. The group’s aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan. It is
politically aligned with the radical political party, Jamiat
Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). The United States
announced the addition of JEM to the US Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) list—which includes organizations that are
believed to support terrorist groups and have assets in US jurisdiction
that can be frozen or controlled—in October 2001 and the Foreign
Terrorist Organization list in December 2001. By 2003, JEM had
splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI) and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF).
Pakistan banned KUA and JUF in November 2003. First designated in
December 2001.
Activities
The JEM’s leader, Masood Azhar, was released from Indian imprisonment
in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages.
The HUA kidnappings in 1994 by Omar Sheik of US and British nationals
in New Delhi and the HUA/al-Faran kidnappings in July 1995 of
Westerners in Kashmir were two of several previous HUA efforts to free
Azhar. The JEM on 1 October 2001 claimed responsibility for a suicide
attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in
Srinagar that killed at least 31 persons but later denied the claim.
The Indian Government has publicly implicated the JEM—along with
Lashkar-i-Tayyiba—for the attack on 13 December 2001 on the Indian
Parliament that killed nine and injured 18. Pakistani authorities
suspect that perpetrators of fatal anti-Christian attacks in Islamabad,
Murree, and Taxila during 2002 were affiliated with the JEM.
Strength
Has several hundred armed supporters located in Pakistan and in India’s
southern Kashmir and Doda regions and in the Kashmir valley, including
a large cadre of former HUM members. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis
and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan
war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars,
improvised explosive devices, and rocket grenades.
Location/Area of Operation
Pakistan. The JEM maintained training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of 2001.
External Aid
Most of the JEM’s cadre and material resources have been drawn from the
militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) and the Harakat
ul-Mujahidin (HUM). The JEM had close ties to Afghan Arabs and the
Taliban. Usama Bin Ladin is suspected of giving funding to the JEM. The
JEM also collects funds through donation requests in magazines and
pamphlets. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani
Government, the JEM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in
legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and
production of consumer goods.
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Description
Jemaah Islamiya is a Southeast Asian–based terrorist network with links
to al-Qaida. The network recruited and trained extremists in the late
1990s, following the stated goal of creating an Islamic state
comprising Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern
Philippines, and southern Thailand. First designated in October 2002.
Activities
JI was responsible for the bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in
Jakarta on 5 August 2003, the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002, and an
attack against the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia in August 2000.
The Bali plot, which left more than 200 dead, was reportedly the final
outcome of meetings in early 2002 in Thailand, where attacks against
Singapore and soft targets such as tourist spots in the region were
also considered. In December 2001, Singapore authorities uncovered a JI
plot to attack the US and Israeli Embassies and British and Australian
diplomatic buildings in Singapore, and in June 2003, Thai authorities
disrupted a JI plan to attack several Western embassies and tourist
sites there. Investigations also linked the JI to bombings in December
2000 where dozens of bombs were detonated in Indonesia and the
Philippines, killing 22 in the Philippines and 15 in Indonesia.
The capture in August of Indonesian Riduan bin Isomoddin (a.k.a.
Hambali), JI leader and al-Qaida Southeast Asia operations chief,
damaged the JI, but the group maintains its ability to target Western
interests in the region and to recruit new members through a network of
radical Islamic schools based primarily in Indonesia.
Strength
Exact numbers are currently unknown, and Southeast Asian authorities
continue to uncover and arrest additional JI elements. Elements of
total JI members vary widely from the hundreds to the thousands.
Location/Area of Operation
JI is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, southern Thailand, and Pakistan and may have some presence
in neighboring countries.
External Aid
Investigations indicate that, in addition to raising its own funds, JI
receives money and logistic assistance from Middle Eastern and South
Asian contacts, nongovernmental organizations, and other
groups—including al-Qaida.
Al-Jihad
a.k.a. Jihad Group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad [EIJ]
Description
This Egyptian Islamic extremist group merged with Usama Bin Ladin’s
al-Qaida organization in June 2001. Active since the 1970s, the EIJ’s
primary goals traditionally have been to overthrow the Egyptian
Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack US and
Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. EIJ members who didn’t join
al-Qaida retain the capability to conduct independent operations. First
designated in October 1997.
Activities
Historically specialized in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian
Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car bombings
against official US and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was
responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat. Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of
Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef
Sedky in November 1993. Has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since
1993 and has never successfully targeted foreign tourists there.
Responsible for Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995, and in
1998 an attack against US Embassy in Albania was thwarted.
Strength
Unknown, but probably has several hundred hard-core members.
Location/Area of Operation
Historically operated in the Cairo area, but most of its network is
outside Egypt, including Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the
United Kingdom, and its activities have been centered outside Egypt for
several years.
External Aid
Unknown. The Egyptian Government claims that Iran supports the Jihad.
Received most of its funding from al-Qaida after early 1998—close ties
that culminated in the eventual merger of the two groups. Some funding
may come from various Islamic nongovernmental organizations, cover
businesses, and criminal acts.
Kahane Chai
a.k.a. Kach Description
Stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach (founded
by radical Israeli- American rabbi Meir Kahane) and its offshoot Kahane
Chai, which means “Kahane Lives,” (founded by Meir Kahane’s son
Binyamin following his father’s assassination in the United States)
were declared terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli
Cabinet under the 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the groups’
statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein’s attack in February 1994
on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque— Goldstein was affiliated with Kach—and their
verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. Palestinian gunmen killed
Binyamin Kahane and his wife in a drive-by shooting in December 2000 in
the West Bank. Kahane Chai and Kach were first designated separately in
October 1997.
Activities
The group has organized protests against the Israeli Government. Kach
has harassed and threatened Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli Government
officials. Has vowed revenge for the deaths of Binyamin Kahane and his
wife. Suspected of involvement in a number of low-level attacks since
the start of the al-Aqsa intifadh.
Strength
Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation
Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba’ in Hebron.
External Aid
Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.
Kongra-Gel
(KGK) (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party,
PKK, KADEK)
a.k.a. Kurdistan
People’s Congress,
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy
Congress
(KADEK), Freedom
and Democracy
Congress of
Kurdistan Description
Founded in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group primarily
composed of Turkish Kurds. The group’s goal has been to establish an
independent, democratic Kurdish state in the Middle East. In the early
1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include
urban terrorism. Turkish authorities captured Chairman Abdullah Ocalan
in Kenya in early 1999; the Turkish State Security Court subsequently
sentenced him to death. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a “peace
initiative,” ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting
dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. At a PKK Congress in January
2000, members supported Ocalan’s initiative and claimed the group now
would use only political means to achieve its public goal of improved
rights for Kurds in Turkey. In April 2002 at its 8th Party Congress,
the PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy
Congress (KADEK) and proclaimed a commitment to nonviolent activities
in support of Kurdish rights. Despite this pledge, a PKK/KADEK
spokesman stated that its armed wing, The People’s Defense Force, would
not disband or surrender its weapons for reasons of self-defense. In
late 2003, the group sought to engineer another political face-lift,
renaming the group Kongra-Gel (KGK) and brandishing its “peaceful”
intentions, while continuing to commit attacks and refuse disarmament.
First designated in October 1997.
Activities
Primary targets have been Turkish Government security forces in Turkey,
local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization in
Turkey. Conducted attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial
facilities in dozens of West European cities in 1993 and again in
spring 1995. In an attempt to damage Turkey’s tourist industry, the
then PKK bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists
in the early-tomid 1990s. KGK continued to engage in violent
acts—including at least one terrorist attack—against the Turkish state
in 2003. Several members were arrested in Istanbul in late 2003 in
possession of explosive materials.
Strength
Approximately 4,000 to 5,000, most of whom currently are located in
northern Iraq. Has thousands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates primarily in Turkey, Europe, and the Middle East.
External Aid
Has received safehaven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Syria
and Iran appear to cooperate with Turkey against KGK in a limited
fashion when it serves their immediate interests. KGK uses Europe for
fundraising and conducting political propaganda.
Lashkar–Tayyiba (LT)
(Army of the
Righteous) Description
The LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization,
Markaz-ud- Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI)—a Sunni anti-US missionary
organization formed in 1989. The LT is led by Hafi z Muhammad Saeed and
is one of the three-largest and besttrained groups fighting in Kashmir
against India; it is not connected to a political party. The United
States in October 2001 announced the addition of the LT to the US
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) list—which
includes organizations that are believed to support terrorist groups
and have assets in US jurisdiction that can be frozen or controlled.
The group was banned, and the Pakistani Government froze its assets in
January 2002. The LT is also known by the name of its associated
organization, Jamaat ud-Dawa (JUD). Musharraf placed JUD on a watchlist
in November 2003. First designated in December 2001.
Activities
The LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and
civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since 1993. The LT claimed
responsibility for numerous attacks in 2001, including an attack in
January on Srinagar airport that killed five Indians along with six
militants; an attack on a police station in Srinagar that killed at
least eight officers and wounded several others; and an attack in April
against Indian border-security forces that left at least four dead. The
Indian Government publicly implicated the LT—along with JEM—for the
attack on 13 December 2001 on the Indian Parliament building, although
concrete evidence is lacking. The LT is also suspected of involvement
in the attack on 14 May 2002 on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak that
left 36 dead. Senior al-Qaida lieutenant Abu Zubaydah was captured at
an LT safehouse in Faisalabad in March 2002, suggesting some members
are facilitating the movement of al-Qaida members in Pakistan.
Strength
Has several thousand members in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and in southern
Jammu and Kashmir and Doda regions and in the Kashmir valley. Almost
all LT cadres are Pakistanis from madrassas across Pakistan and Afghan
veterans of the Afghan wars. Uses assault rifles, light and heavy
machineguns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.
Location/Area of Operation
Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad.
External Aid
Collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and
United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and Pakistani and other Kashmiri business
people. The LT also maintains a Web site (under the name of its
associated organization Jamaat ud-Daawa), through which it solicits
funds and provides information on the group’s activities. The amount of
LT funding is unknown. The LT maintains ties to religious/ military
groups around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the Middle
East and Chechnya through the fraternal network of its parent
organization Jamaat ud-Dawa (formerly Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad). In
anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, the LT
withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses,
such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer
goods.
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)
(Army of Jhangvi) Description
Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is the militant offshoot of the Sunni sectarian
group Sipah-i- Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The group focuses primarily on
anti-Shia attacks and was banned by Pakistani President Musharraf in
August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence. Many of
its members then sought refuge with the Taliban in Afghanistan, with
whom they had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban, LJ
members became active in aiding other terrorists with safehouses, false
identities, and protection in Pakistani cities, including Karachi,
Peshawar, and Rawalpindi. In January 2003, the United States added LJ
to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. First designated in
January 2003.
Activities
LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings. The group attempted to
assassinate former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shabaz
Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab Province, in January 1999. Pakistani
authorities have publicly linked LJ members to the kidnap and murder of
US journalist Daniel Pearl in early 2002. Police officials initially
suspected LJ members were involved in the two suicide car-bombings in
Karachi in 2002—against a French shuttle bus in May and the US
Consulate in June—but their subsequent investigations have not led to
any LJ members being charged in the attacks. Similarly, press reports
have linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in Pakistan, including a
grenade assault on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad in
March 2002 that killed two US citizens, but no formal charges have been
fi led against the group. Pakistani authorities believe LJ was
responsible for the bombing in July 2003 of a Shiite mosque in Quetta,
Pakistan.
Strength
Probably fewer than 100.
Location/Area of Operation
LJ is active primarily in Punjab and Karachi. Some members travel between Pakistan
and Afghanistan.
External Aid
Unknown.